Energy Contract Settlements through Automated Negotiation in Residential Cooperatives by Chakraborty, S. (Shantanav) et al.
Energy Contract Settlements through Automated
Negotiation in Residential Cooperatives
Shantanu Chakraborty
The University of Melbourne, Australia.
shantanu.chakraborty@unimelb.edu.au
Tim Baarslag and Michael Kaisers
Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
{T.Baarslag, Michael.Kaisers}@cwi.nl
Abstract—This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer
(P2P) negotiation strategy for settling energy contracts among
prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative (REC) consider-
ing heterogeneous prosumer preferences. The heterogeneity arises
from prosumers’ evaluation of energy contracts through multiple
societal and environmental criteria and the prosumers’ private
preferences over those criteria. The prosumers engage in bilateral
negotiations with peers to mutually agree on periodical energy
contracts/loans that consist of an energy volume to be exchanged
at that period and the return time of the exchanged energy. The
prosumers keep an ordered preference profile of possible energy
contracts by evaluating the contracts from their own valuations
on the entailed criteria, and iteratively offer the peers contracts
until an agreement is formed. A prosumer embeds the valuations
into a utility function that further considers uncertainties imposed
by demand and generation profiles. Empirical evaluation on
real demand, generation and storage profiles illustrates that the
proposed negotiation based strategy is able to increase the system
efficiency (measured by utilitarian social welfare) and fairness
(measured by Nash social welfare) over a baseline strategy and
an individual flexibility control strategy. We thus elicit system
benefits from P2P flexibility exchange already with few agents
and without central coordination, providing a simple yet flexible
and effective paradigm that may complement existing markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
The joint coordination of prosumers’ distributed energy
resources (DER) in a Residential Energy Cooperative (REC)
has the potential to shape the overall demand and to miti-
gate fluctuations caused by renewable integration. However,
properly incentivizing the prosumers to coordinate their lo-
cally owned distributed resources is quite a challenge, and
justifiably a field of active research in Smart Grids. Local
energy exchange may offer incentives to the prosumers to
engage in competition and in local trading [1]. For energy
communities, these mechanisms may need to take into account
and balance several objectives, including, next to efficiency,
altruism, or fairness of allocations [2]. Prosumers in a REC
may have diverse preferences over how their energy profiles
are valued due to various societal and environmental factors.
For instance, the prosumers may evaluate energy contracts
based on several criteria, e.g. self-sufficiency or autarky, cost
of energy, loss in flexibility, sustainability, and so on [3],
resulting in a private valuation. While complete preferences
would need to be computed and revealed for market based
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication.
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solutions, peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation proceed iteratively,
reducing the amount of information revealed.
Automated negotiation is an organic process of joint de-
cision making where multiple stakeholders – typically rep-
resented by autonomous agents – with conflicting interests
engage and make a decision [4]. The negotiation approach
contrasts market-based approaches, and its iterative nature
provides a more natural model for low liquidity settings,
in which personalized solutions need to be found in large
outcome spaces. P2P negotiation within REC’s is still a widely
unexplored area of research, with a few exceptions; e.g., an
automated negotiation protocol has been applied to address
energy exchange between off-grid smart homes [5]. However,
their designed protocol imposes several key restrictions, in
which only two exchange periods over a day in which only
equal amounts energy volume can be exchanged.
We present an automated negotiation approach as an energy
exchange mechanism to settle P2P energy contract as loans
between prosumers in a REC. During each negotiation session,
a pair of prosumers (represented by software agents) engage
in bilateral negotiation by exchanging and eventually agreeing
on energy contracts, comprised of several negotiation issues
(here energy volume and return time). The proxy agents
evaluate offers based on criteria that model the heterogeneous
preferences of the users they represent: 1) loss in flexibility (in
local storage), and 2) autarky or sustainability of the offers.
The agents are able to weigh these criteria differently, thereby
enabling heterogeneity and trade-offs between the agents.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We propose a novel and intuitive negotiation based strat-
egy that considers heterogeneity in prosumers through a
distributed and autonomous agent model.
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed negotiation
based strategy over real residential demand, generation,
and storage data to elucidate the efficiency of the strategy
in increasing the social welfare over a baseline strategy
and an individual flexibility control strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes a residential prosumer model, and defines the energy
contract that is used in the negotiation process. Section III
presents the negotiation based energy exchange strategy and
the contextual notion of allocative efficiency. Simulation case
studies are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V con-
cludes the paper with a glimpse of possible follow-up research.
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II. MODELING PROSUMERS AND ENERGY CONTRACTS
In this section, we present a prosumer by systematically
modeling their load and generation profiles integrated with
batteries. Later, we define energy contracts with associated
concepts, uncertainty management in planning, and aspects of
the negotiation process. We assume that the energy cooper-
ative forms a Microgrid and is located at the Low Voltage
(LV) distribution network where the prosumers are physically
connected to exchange energy.
A. Prosumer Model
A prosumer is assumed to be equipped with a renewable
power generation unit (e.g. Solar Photovoltaic, PV) and a
flexible resource (e.g. battery energy storage system). We
represent a prosumer as a software agent, i ∈ N , where N
is the set of agents in the cooperative. Let the (predicted)
generation profile (through PV panels) of an agent i be
represented by P˜ vi(t), ∀t ∈ T , where T is the set of time-
periods. Similarly, the predicted load profile of the agent i,
at t is represented by L˜di(t). In addition, the battery dispatch
(load) profile is denoted as Pbi(t), and a choice of agent i. The
battery state of charge is modeled by the following equation
Xi(t) = Xi(t− 1) + ηb × Pbi(t)×∆t− b, (1)
where, Xi(t) is state of charge (SOC) of the battery at t and
is operated within a limit. The constant degradation of the
battery is represented by b. The dispatched battery power,
Pbi(t) is constrained to operate within a limit. The efficiency
of the battery, ηb is dependent on whether the battery is being
charged (with efficiency ηcb) or discharged (with efficiency η
d
b )
ηb =
{
ηcb , if Pbi(t) ≥ 0
1
ηdb
, otherwise (2)
After self-consumption, the net demand of agent i becomes
L˜d
net
i (t) = L˜di(t)− P˜ vi(t). (3)
An agent i engages in a trade with a subset of peers j ∈ J ⊆ N
at t, and the volume of energy being traded with each other
is denoted as exi,j(t). The residual of agent i – after self-
consumption, followed by the (cumulative) exchange with the
peers and the local battery activation – is the energy either
wasted or to be traded on the external market, and is presented
by the following energy balancing equation.
L˜d
res
i (t) = L˜d
net
i (t) +
∑
j∈J
exi,j(t) + Pbi(t). (4)
B. Energy Contracts: P2P energy lending
A simple but effective contract to exchange flexibility in
energy systems are energy loans [6], which we here adapt to
the P2P setting. In automated multi-issue negotiation, agents
negotiate over several issues with a target to achieve an
agreement – a value attribution to those issues – that generates
a socially optimal outcome for the participating agents. We
consider energy loans parameterized by two important issues
over which the agents negotiate:
1. The volume of energy to be traded between two agents
(denoted by q ∈ Q ⊆ R, where Q is a discrete set of
energy volumes).
2. The time of receiving the energy back (denoted by τ ∈
T ⊆ Z+>0, where T is a discrete set of positive time
periods).
A negotiation domain Ω comprises all possible energy con-
tracts, i.e. Ω = Q × T . Every ω = (q, τ) ∈ Ω is a potential
energy contract (or loan) within the multi-issue negotiation
that specifies a value for each issue.
The energy volume q and the return time t + τ influence
respective energy profiles for both negotiating agents and
consequently affect their local flexibility dispatch. As depicted
before, agents may have varied preferences over a predefined
set of criteria, i.e. the agents tend to weigh the criteria
differently. Let C represent the set of criteria upon which
the agents state their preferences. In this paper, we assume
an agent evaluates an energy profile – resulting from an
energy contract – based on two criteria: loss in flexibility and
autarky i.e. C := {c1 = loss in flexibility, c2 = autarky}.
The weight an agent i places on criterion c ∈ C can be
represented as a scaler λic (where λ
i
c are normalized weights,
i.e.
∑
cλ
i
c = 1) and is private to i. We assume, the weights
are known to agent. An evaluation function, eic,t(ω) is defined
that denotes how an energy contract performs, at t, from the
perspective of criterion c given the private preferences of agent
i. Additionally, an agent maintains a planning horizon, w that
represents how far ahead of the agent looks while deciding
about the contracts. The planning horizon depends on the
uncertainty on the demand/generation prediction.
Criterion 1: Criterion loss in flexibility measures the emer-
gent loss (in energy) due to the round-trip efficiency of the
flexibility (e.g. battery) dispatch resulting from implementing
an energy contract. The evaluation function associated with
loss in flexibility is defined as
eic1,t(ω) =
k=t+w∑
k=t
Pbi(k) + Θ(Xi), (5)
where Θ(Xi) is the offset power required to adjust the
resulting SOC. Therefore, ω directly influences the battery
dispatch power Pbi(t) through the energy balancing equation,
i.e. Eq. 4.
Criterion 2: Autarky in an energy contract signifies the
sustainability of the contract, which actually measures the total
(estimated) energy to be traded on the external market pro-
vided that the energy contract is implemented. The evaluation
function associated autarky is formally defined as
eic2,t(ω) =
k=t+w∑
k=t
|L˜dresi (k)|. (6)
Agent aggregates the weighted evaluation function of individ-
ual criterion to measure the quality of an energy contract. The
utility function is defined as
fi,t(ω) =
∑
c
λice
i
c,t(ω). (7)
C. Dealing with Uncertainty
The load profile L˜di(t) and generation profile P˜ vi(t) of
an agent i are predicted signals and are potential sources of
uncertainties. The utility function defined in Eq. 7 is, therefore,
unable to provide robust scheduling of local flexibilities. We
utilize a set of stochastic scenarios of predicted net load
profiles L˜d
net
i and calculate the expected utility of an energy
contract [7]. The scenarios of predicted net load profile
are generated by taking samples from a Gaussian Process
comprising of 1) Gaussian error Probability Density Functions
(PDF), for each of the discrete lags l in planning horizon w,
i.e. l = 1, · · · , w, and 2) a Gaussian PDF that models the
interdependency between net load of two consecutive periods.
The predicted net load for scenario s ∈ S is then determined
as L˜d
net
i (t+ l|t, s) = L˜d
net
i (t+ l|t) + di(l, s), where di(l, s)
is sampled from the aforementioned Gaussian Process and
L˜d
net
i (t + l|t) is the predicted net demand for period t + l
when predicted at t1. Now, we can define the expected utility
an energy contract could provide by
E[fi,t(ω)] =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s) · fi,t(ω, s), (8)
where Pr(s) is the probability of the scenario s and fi,t(ω, s)
is the modified utility of an offer ω considering the net
predicted load scenario s. We assume the scenarios are
equiprobable, and thus Pr(s) = 1/|S|. Therefore, in the
negotiation process, the agents distributively search through
the Ω to jointly agree on an energy contract that maximizes
their perspective expected utilities.
III. A NEGOTIATION BASED EXCHANGE MECHANISM
Agents engage in a bilateral negotiation to seek for an
agreement on an energy contract. Given the residential energy
cooperative settings of several connected prosumers, the pro-
cess may be understood as a multilateral negotiation, emerging
from multiple bilateral P2P pairwise negotiations2. As the
negotiation protocol, we implement the alternating offers
protocol [4], which is commonly used in automated multi-
issue negotiation settings. We assume that each agent is limited
to interact once with one other agent in each particular time
period. Several important aspects of the negotiation process
are detailed in the following.
Agreement: An agreement is an energy contract that is
approved by both negotiating agents, and can be denoted by
ω∗ = (q∗, τ∗).
Reservation value: The private value a negotiating agent
keeps as a criterion to accept an offer. Additionally, it also
represents the outside option in case of a disagreement. In
this paper, an agent i sets the reservation value as a quantile
of the distribution of E[fi,t(ω)], ∀ω ∈ Ω for negotiating at t.
1Pseudo-predictions of the net demand are generated by adding Gaussian
noise to the real net demand signal.
2An alternative approach could be multi to multi negotiation. We do not
entertain that option since multi to multi negotiation typically require a
mediator or a centralized coordination, as per the current state of the research.
Additionally, the energy contracts that generate expected utility
higher than the reservation value forms a so-called aspiration
region.
Deadline: The maximum number of rounds of a negotiation
before which the agents should reach an outcome. If no
agreement is formed after the deadline, the negotiation fails.
Preference profile: A negotiating agent contains a preference
profile that accumulates an ordered set of the issues in the
negotiation domain. The agent creates such a profile by
ordering the issues according to their expected utility, defined
in Eq. 8.
Fair outcome: An important measure to quantify the fairness
in an outcome could be conducted by determining the Nash
solution. The Nash solution is essentially the outcome that
maximizes the product of the utilities (Eq. 8), achieved from
an energy contract, of negotiating agents (e.g. agent i and j).
ωNash(t) = max
ω∈Ω
E[fi,t(ω)] · E[fj,t(ω)]. (9)
Figure 1 shows an exemplary negotiation domain and the
associated expected utility (normalized within unit-range) of
all possible energy contracts calculated from the perspective
of an agent that has a reservation value quantile of 70%
of the distribution that results in a value of 0.46 in the
normalized scale. The demarcation of the aspiration regions
in the negotiation domain are outlined through the contoured
line. The figure illustrates that expected utility is smooth over
quantity and nonlinear over return-time.
Fig. 1. An exemplary negotiation domain. The issues are presented at the
axes whereas the expected utility of the contracts is plotted as a heat-map.
The contoured regions are the aspiration region as they contain the preferred
energy contracts with the expected utility higher than the reservation value.
Algorithm 1 describes the high-level algorithm of the nego-
tiation process between two agents A, and B at time t ∈ T .
The process starts with creating negotiation domain Ω that
will be used by both agents. Agents then generate perspective
ordered preference profiles by evaluating all possible contracts
in Ω while considering their expected utility over a planning
Algorithm 1: NEGOTIATE-Contract(A, B, t, Q, T )
begin
Ω←− createNegotiationDomain(Q, T )
A.generateOrderedPreferenceProfile(Ω, t)
B.generateOrderedPreferenceProfile(Ω, t)
r ←− 0
offerAccepted←− False
while r < deadline AND NOT offerAccepted do
if r%2 = 0 then
offer ←− A.makeOffer(t)
offerAccepted←− B.acceptOffer(offer, t)
else
offer ←− B.makeOffer(t)
offerAccepted←− A.acceptOffer(offer, t)
r ←− r + 1
if offerAccepted then
A.implementContract(offer, t, B)
B.implementContract(offer, t, A)
else
A.implementReservePlan(t)
B.implementReservePlan(t)
return offerAccepted
horizon w. Subsequently, an alternating offers protocol is
implemented where, in each round, one of the agents proposes
an offer (picked from the ordered preference profile) to the
other agent until an agreement is reached or the deadline
is encountered. In case an agreement is reached, the agents
implement the agreed energy contract. Otherwise, the plans
associated with the reservation values are implemented by
each agent. While implementing an energy contract, an agent
(for instance, A) amends to an existing exchange pool by
stating how much energy (q∗) to be traded with whom (for
instance, B) and when (t) as well as by listing the same volume
of energy (−q∗) is committed to be traded back at (t + τ∗)
from B.
A. Efficiency and Fairness
In this section, we define the following strategies – apart
from the proposed negotiation based energy exchange – to
illustrate the efficiency of the proposed strategy.
• No flexibility, s0: The prosumers do not activate their
batteries and only trade residuals with external market.
• Individual control, s1: This strategy is being currently
utilized in the real residential setting, where the pro-
sumers activate their local batteries, individually control
the batteries and trade the residuals with external market.
However, prosumers do not engage in trading with each
other.
• Negotiation and control, s2: The proposed strategy where
prosumers engage in bilateral negotiation over energy
contracts with peers, implement the agreement, and fi-
nally activate their batteries to control the residual energy.
The remaining energy is traded in external market.
The properties of the strategies are briefed in Table I. Now, we
define the utility of an agent achieved by applying a particular
strategy. Note that, it differs from the utility function defined in
Eq. 7 which measured the quality of an energy contract. The
utility of the proposed strategy s2 considers the realized energy
profile, after periodically negotiating and implementing the
TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF THE STRATEGIES.
Strategy Local trading Flexibility activation
No flexibility No No
Individual control No Yes
Negotiation and control Yes Yes
agreement. The utility is, therefore, similar to Eq. 7 but taking
into account the realized energy profile and the consequent
battery dispatch.
ui(s2) = λ1 ×
[
T∑
t
Pbi(t) + Θ(Xi)
]
+ λ2 ×
[
T∑
t
|Ldresi (t)|
]
.
(10)
For strategy s0, the ui(s0) only considers the autarky
components (without the energy exchange component, i.e.∑
j∈J exi,j(t) in Eq. 4). And for strategy s1, the ui(s1)
considers both criteria, but again without the flexibility com-
ponent. In order to validate the efficiency of the strategies
S := {s0, s1, s2} in improving the social welfare, we define
the utilitarian social welfare as sws =
∑N
i ui(s) for all s ∈ S.
Moreover, we quantify the relative fairness of a strategy s (to
another strategy h) based on the Nash social welfare criterion,
an established concept of fairness [8], as following
nws|h =
N∏
i
(ui(s)− ui(h)) . (11)
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we consider two cases of varied scaled
cooperatives to empirically evaluate different aspects of the
proposed strategy.
• Case 1: Cooperative of 2 agents presents the effects
of the proposed strategy on the residual demand and
consequent battery dispatch, and the agents’ negotiation
domain exploring phenomena.
• Case 2: Cooperative of 9 agents verifies the quality of
the allocation achieved by the proposed strategy from the
perspectives of efficiency and fairness.
The aforementioned cases assume the local flexibility (i.e.
battery) is owned privately and controlled individually by the
prosumers3.
A. Case 1: Cooperative of 2 Agents
Flexibility activation through battery enhances the potential
benefits as two agents could negotiate even when their net
demand status are equal (i.e. both positive or negative). The
specification of the agents with associated battery information
is provided in Table II. The charging and discharging rates
3The total simulation period is taken as 20 days with 15-minute of
granularity, i.e. ∆t = 15. The planning horizon w is set out to be 48-
hours. The number of scenarios |S| is set to 100. The set Q contains 10
discrete energy quantities, and the set T contains discrete time steps of
{2, 3, · · · , w × ∆t}. The deadline of a negotiation session is set out to be
5000 rounds.
(a) Execution of an agreement. (b) Outcome space: Agreement at round 792. (c) Issue space.
Fig. 2. (a) Effects of executing agreements – on net demand and battery dispatch profiles – reached through negotiation between two agents. (b) An exemplary
outcome space of agent A and agent B with marginal cumulative distributions of their expected utilities. The Nash solution, agreement and No-deal solution
are plotted to illustrate the relative distances. (c) The negotiation domain with the juxtaposed aspiration regions bounded by contour lines for both agents.
The negotiation traces, represented by the colored scatters, depict the behavior of the agents with the opponents as both of them converge to the agreement.
TABLE II
AGENT SPECIFICATIONS.
Agent Reservation (%) λc1 λc2 Capacity[kWh] Efficiency
A 52 0.33 0.67 6.8 0.9
B 50 0.71 0.29 7.0 0.8
of these batteries are 1.3kW and 3.3kW, respectively. The
SOC the batteries are operated within 20% to 90% of the
respective capacity, and the degradation rate is set as 0.4% of
the same. As pointed in the Table, agent A values criterion c2
than criterion c1; that is the agent places higher preferences
on autarky, while agent B prefers loss in flexibility more.
Figure 2(a) shows effects of energy exchange (through
negotiation) and resulting battery dispatch between agent A
and agent B. The residual demand profiles resulting from
negotiation clearly reflect the preferences of the agents. For
instance, the battery dispatch profile of agent B, who cares
more about the loss in flexibility, exhibits a relative fluctuating
signal that results in an almost neutralized losses. The apparent
fluctuations in the battery dispatches are due to the fact
that they both implement a naive battery scheduling tech-
nique, as described in Section II-A. However, in the proposed
framework, agents can easily mitigate such fluctuations by
integrating an additional cost function (that penalizes such
behavior) into their utility function, and placing a higher
weight on that cost function.
Now, we analyze the exploration of negotiation domain by
agents while reaching an agreement. The battery specifications
of the agents are kept identical and similar to agent A. The
reservation quantile are kept as 95% for the agents. Figure 2(b)
depicts a two-dimensional outcome space that emerges from
the negotiation interactions between the agents, and their
marginal cumulative distributions of (expected) utility over
negotiation domain. Noticeably, while the agreement generates
the highest utility for agent B, agent A needs to compromise
to reach the agreement. Although, the agreement does not
reach the Nash solution, it still yields utilities that are located
over 95% quantile range of the distributions. The no-deal
solution defines the situation when the agents do not engage
in negotiation, and consequently do not exchange energy. The
trace of negotiation – from the perspective of individual agents
– illustrate the power of heterogeneous preferences and the
multi-issue setting, because the agents are able to explore their
iso-utility curves, and concede until an agreement is found.
The corresponding negotiation domain, with the issues and
aspiration regions of both the agents are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2(c). The agreement is located at one of the intersections
of the agents’ contoured region of aspiration value.
Fig. 3. Distributions of the Euclidean distance (fitted via F-distributions)
to the Nash solution from the agreements and the no-deal solutions in the
utility/outcome space. The resulting agreements are more inclined to be the
Nash solutions, hence confirm the fairness of the energy allocations.
B. Case 2: Cooperative of 9 Agents
In this case, we analyze a higher scaled cooperative with
9 agents comprising similar battery configuration (as agent
A in Case 1) and having similar reservation values. Figure 3
elucidates the quality of the outcome –i.e. agreement – through
the distribution of the Euclidean distance from the agreement
to the Nash solution, and how the agreement outperforms the
no-deal solution by being more likely to be the Nash solution.
The distances are measured for each negotiation session over
the whole simulation periods and normalized within unit range.
Now, we turn the analysis toward the allocative efficiency
of the proposed negotiation strategy, and how the strategy
establishes itself preferable for all agents over a baseline
strategy of no flexibility and a strategy of individual control
of flexibility without any P2P exchange. Figure 4 presents the
relative increase in utility for each prosumer of an EC with
9 agents, comparing the improvements of individual control
strategy and negotiation and control strategy over No flexibility
strategy. As seen in the figure, (ui(s2) − ui(s0)) dominates
over (ui(s1) − ui(s0)) by placing itself over the dashed
line. Therefore, it implies that the social welfare criteria,
both utilitarian and Nash are maximized by the proposed
negotiation and control strategy.
Fig. 4. Agents utility improvement of individual control strategy (horizontal)
and negotiation and control strategy (vertical) over no flexibility baseline.
Agents are above the dashed equal improvements line, hence our newly
proposed strategy dominates individual control, while also improving relative
fairness (nws2|s0 ≈ 1.38 · 1019 > nws1|s0 ≈ 3.35 · 1017).
V. CONCLUSION
A residential cooperative potentially exhibits inefficiencies
due to renewable power integration and uncoordinated ac-
tivations of locally owned distributed energy resources of
heterogeneous prosumers. Automated negotiation – a natural
model of interaction – has the ability to alleviate these ineffi-
ciencies by accommodating the heterogeneous preferences of
prosumers in joint decision making. In this paper, we have
presented a P2P automated bilateral negotiation strategy for
energy contract settlement between prosumers. The prosumers
jointly seek for an agreement on energy contracts/loans –
consisting of energy volume to be exchanged and the return
time of the exchanged energy – that maximise their preferences
by evaluating the realized energy profiles and the consequent
flexibility dispatch. Although we consider a predefined set of
criteria for the agents to have the preferences on, in reality,
the agents may have a diverse set of mutually exclusive con-
straints that shape up their personal preferences. The proposed
negotiation strategy allows the agents to effortlessly stack-up
those local constraints weighing by preferences while settling
for the contracts. The proposed negotiation based strategy is
applied to real energy profiles, and results in an improved
utilitarian social welfare as well as improved fairness w.r.t.
Nash social welfare; which is remarkable considering that
the allocations are achieved from single pairwise interactions
amongst prosumers.
In this paper, we assume the weights an agent places on the
criteria to be predefined, whereas in practice, an agent may be
uncertain about the preferences and may need to elicit them
from prosumers in a cost-effective way [9], [10]. Future work
may investigate the case where the agents exhibit uncertainty
over the preferences and are required to negotiate successfully
with partial preferences.
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